In this paper, we present a new development of inspection games in a mean field setting. In our dynamic version of an inspection game, there is one inspector and a large number N interacting inspectees with a finite state space. By applying the mean field game methodology, we present a solution as an ǫ-equilibrium to this type of inspection games, where ǫ goes to 0 as N tends to infinity. In order to facilitate numerical analysis of this new type inspection game, we conduct an approximation analysis, that is we approximate the optimal Lipschitz continuous switching strategies by smooth switching strategies. We show that any approximating smooth switching strategy is also an ǫ-equilibrium solution to the inspection game with a large and finite number N of inspectees with ǫ being of order 1/N .
Introduction
An inspection game is a non-cooperative game whose players are often called an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspectee, which may be an individual, an organisation, a state or a country, is obliged to follow certain regulations but has an incentive to violate them. The inspector tries to minimise the impact of such violations by means of inspections that uncover them.
A simple example of an inspection game can be described by the following 2x2 normal form game in Table 1 , where the inspectee is the row player and the inspector is the column player, and the left (resp. right) entry of each cell corresponds to the payoffs for the individual (resp. inspector). Typically an inspection game has a mixed equilibrium.
Inspect Not Inspect
Violate −1, 1 2, −2
Comply 0, −1 0, 0 Inspection games were introduced by Dresher (1962) and Kuhn(1963) , the underlying motivation was the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union and the desire to monitor the various arms control agreements that were signed by the two superpowers. Analytically, these settings led quite naturally to two-person game formulations with various assumptions about the strategy sets that were feasible to each of the two parties.
Inspection games have been investigated quite extensively during the last five decades. They have a wide variety of applications to name a few such as arms control by Avenhaus et al. (1996) , auditing of accounts by Borch (1990) , tax inspection by Greenberg (1984) and Alm and McKee (2004) , environmental protection by Avenhaus (1994) , quality control in supply chains by Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) , Tapiero and Kogan (2007) , Hsieh and Liu (2010) , stock keeping by Fandel and Trockel (2008) and communication infrastructures by Gianini et al. (2013) , Chung, Hollinger and Isler (2011) . The research on inspection games contributes to the construction of an effective inspection policy for the inspector when an illegal action is executed strategically.
In the literature, attentions are mainly on two-person zero-sum games, with some drifts to two-person non-zero-sums models. As far as we know, there are very few models with multiple inspectees. In the arms control inspection context, Kilgour and Averhaus (1994) considered a model with two or more inspectees, where the inspectees are independent and the inspector's inspection is a binary variable, namely inspector decides whether to inspect or not. Later Avenhaus and Kilgour (2004) studied another model with two inspectees, where the inspector has a fixed level and continuously divisible inspection resources. They answered the question on how the inspector distributes efficiently its limited inspection resources over several independent inspectees.
In a recent work on distributed information systems, Gianini et al. (2013) study a simultaneous one-shot inspection game with uncoordinated m inspectors and n non-interacting inspectees. In their model, an inspector has limited resources but the probability of detection is not a function of the resourcee. They show that due to the lack of coupling among inspectees, adding or removing inspectees does not change the best mixed strategy of one inspectee. Kolokoltsov, Passi and Yang (2013) develop a dynamic inspection game model with one inspector and a large number of interacting inspectees in an evolutionary setting. In that model, each inspectee is under evolutionary pressure and periodically updates their strategies after binary interactions. Specifically, at the beginning of each period, an exogenous and fixed fraction of the population can update their behaviour upon meeting another randomly chosen individual in the population. If two inspectees meet and have the same strategy, then that strategy is retained by the updating individual. If however, the two individuals have different strategies, the updating individual may revise his behaviour on the basis of the payoffs enjoyed by the two in the previous period. Solutions in terms of mixed strategies to this type of games are presented therein.
In this paper, we present a new development of inspection games in a mean field setting. In this new model of inspection games, there is one inspector and a large number of interacting inspectees. Different from the settings by Kilgour and Avenhaus (1994) , Avenhaus and Kilgour (2004) and Gianini et al. (2013) where the multiple inspectees are independent, our new model considers interacting inspectees in the sense that one inspectee's payoff does depend on one another's strategy. Also different from the evolutionary setting by Kolokoltsov, Passi and Yang (2013) where the binary interactions are considered and inspectees have no payoff functions, in our new model each inspectee aims to maximise her own total expected payoff which depends on the aggregate behaviour of the population. We aim to approximate the Nash solution to this new type of dynamic inspection games by using the recently developed theory of mean field games.
The mean field game theory is a new branch of game theory and it has become a powerful tool to study complex games with a large number of players. The initial work done by Lasry and Lions (2006a , 2006b and Caines (2006, 2007) consider continuoustime continuous-state games. In this paper in the context of inspection games, we study a mean field game in a finite state space setting. The finite state space setting is also considered within the context of socio-economic sciences by Souza (2010, 2013) , Gomes, Velho, Wolfram (2014a , 2014b , wherein the authors study one hyperbolic equation and focus on the analysis of shock-formation phenomenon of the system in the setting of two-state mean field games. Though those above mentioned papers consider a similar framework as the one in this paper, different approaches are applied. In this paper, we apply a modified version of the standard mean field games method, namely we study a system of coupled two differential equations with one being forward and the other one backward. Our model contributes to the study of mean field games on a finite state space with a major player.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the model of an inspection game with one inspector and a large number N inspectees. In Section 3, we set up a mean field inspection game with a continuum of inspectees and derive the system of coupled equations (3.12)-(3.13). Main results of this paper are shown in Section 4. First, in Theorem 4.1, we show that for a short time game, there exists a unique solution to the mean field inspection game, namely, the single inspector has a unique best response to the continuum of inspectees and any representative inspectee has a unique best response to the inspector and the aggregate behaviour of the continuum; whereas, for a long time game, we show the existence of a solution to the mean field inspection game. Then in Theorem 4.2, we show that the probability distributions of finite N -inspectees on their state space converges to the one of a continuum limit as N → ∞. Finally, in Theorem 4.3 we conclude that an optimal Lipschitz continuous switching strategy, which is derived from the mean field inspection game, is an ǫ-equilibrium to an inspection game with a finite number N of inspectees, with ǫ = ǫ(N ) → 0 as N → ∞. In Section 5 we conduct an approximation analysis in order to adapt our theoretical results for numerical analysis and to discuss the rate of convergence. We approximate optimal Lipschitz continuous switching strategies q * by a sequence of smooth switching strategies q * η , η > 0. We show that any approximating smooth switching strategies q * η is also an ǫ-equilibrium solution to the finite N inspection game, with ǫ = ǫ(N, η) → 0 as N → ∞ and η → 0. Further, using smooth switching strategies q * η as an ǫ-equilibrium solution, we show that ǫ = ǫ(N, η) is of order 1/N .
An inspection game with N interacting inspectees
We consider a dynamic inspection game in a continuous time setting with a finite time horizon T > 0. In this game, there is one inspector and N (a fixed integer) inspectees (refereed to as the population). Roughly speaking, every inspectee chooses her crime levels they would commit to maximise her payoff function. The controlled dynamics of crime levels for each inspectee is modelled as a controlled continuous-time Markov Chain. The inspector decides the amount of investment for inspection so as to maximise her payoff, based on the observation of the crime distribution. To study this game, normally one looks for a profile of best responses for all inspectees and the inspector.
Formally, first we discuss the N inspectees. Let
, are interpreted as crime levels; in other words, l i can be understood as illegal profits one can gain by committing crimes.
Denote by Σ d the set of probability distributions on L d , i.e.
and by C([0, T ], Σ d ) the set of continuous curves {x(t) ∈ Σ d , t ∈ [0, T ]}, equipped with the norm
where · denotes the Euclidean norm in R d . The dynamics of every inspectee is modelled by a continuous-time Markov chain on L d . Every inspectee chooses a switching strategy between the crime levels to maximise her own objective function. Specifically, the dynamics of the crime levels of the inspectee a ∈ {1, . . . , N } is modelled by a continuous-time Markov chain
is specified by the switching matrix
which is chosen by the ath inspectee. At any time t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Σ d and j = i, the entry q a ij (t, x) is in [0, Q] and presents the infinitesimal transition rate from state l i to state l j , bounded by a constant Q > 0. Moreover for any i,
is chosen in such a way that q a ii (t, x) = − j =i q a ij (t, x). We are interested in symmetric inspectees, meaning that any inspectees who are at the same time at the same crime level will choose the same switching rate. In other words, the choice of a switching strategy does not depend on the identity of each inspetee. Thus we can omit the identity index and for any (t,
. Next we discuss the dynamics of the population which is denoted by
The dynamics X N is a Markov process and describes the evolution of crime distributions, that is for any i = 1, . . . , d
♯{a ∈ {1, . . . , N } : M (a) (t) = l i } N specifies the proportion of inspectees at the crime level l i at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The superscript N in X N is used to distinguish between the dynamics in the finite population of size N and the one in the limit (to be introduced in Section 3). The state space of the population is denoted by
which is a subset of the closed simplex Σ d defined in (2.1). The Markov process X N on the state space S N d is generated by the time-inhomogenous operator
where e i , i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, denotes the standard basis in R d , namely the ith entry is 1 and all the other entries are 0; (y · e i ) = n i /N for any y = (n 1 /N, . . . , n d /N ). An intuitive probabilistic interpretation of the stochastic process
At the initial stage of this game t = 0, the N inspectees are distributed arbitrarily among the d states {l 1 , . . . , l d }. The initial state of the population is described by the vector X N (0) = (n 1 (0)/N, . . . , n d (0)/N ). Here n j (0), j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, specifies the number of inspectees at the crime level l j at t = 0. As the dynamic of each inspectee is modelled as a Markov chain with a switching matrix in the form of (2.3), every inspectee has a random waiting time at their current crime level before she switches to another crime level. Denote by τ 1 the shortest waiting time among N inspectees. Then at the time τ 1 , it is the first time when an inspectee changes her crime level, say from l i to l j . Consequently, from the initial state X N (0), the Markov process X N obtains the new state:
Then the process X N evolves in the manner as described above from the new state X N (τ 1 ).
It is important to note that the curve {x(t),
the continuum of inspectees (see in the following Eq. (3.13) ). This is the exact place to see how inspectees interact with each other: the state dynamics of ath insepctee M (a) is influenced by all other inspectees strategies through the crime distribution; in other words, any inspectee's state dynamics is influenced by the aggregated behavior of all inspectees. This is what we mean by the mean field interaction setting.
In this model, we do not require that every inspectee has perfect information on the crime levels of all other inspectees, but we assume that everyone has the access to the exact information about the aggregate behaviour of the population, namely the crime distribution.
Next, we introduce the single inspector. The inspector has limited available resources for inspection, denoted by F > 0. At any time t ∈ [0, T ], she needs to decide an amount of resource α(t) ∈ [0, F ] to be invested in inspection in order to maximise her total expected payoff function. It is assumed that the inspection resource is uniformly distributed among the population and the inspector will charge a fine σl j , σ > 0, if she uncovers a crime at the level l j ∈ L d .
Due to the limited resources, a complete surveillance of all inspectees' actions is practically not possible. Therefore, inspection takes place in form of a randomisation. We introduce a detection function, which relates the detection probability to inspection resources and is given by P :
It is assumed that the detection function P is nondecreasing and concave in inspection resources α, i.e.
One way to understand the value P (α) for an α ∈ [0, F ] is that, every inspectee is inspected and an illegal behaviour can be uncovered with the probability P (α). Another interpretation of P (α) is that, with the inspection resources α invested, a proportion P (α) of the population is inspected with perfect inspection, in other words, every inspectee has a probability P (α) to be inspected and an illegal behaviour will be detected with probability 1. Now, we are ready to introduce the payoff functions for inspectees and the single inspector. At each time s ∈ [0, T ] with a crime distribution X N (s) of the population, if the inspector invests α(s) for inspection, the ath inspectee with her crime level M N (s) faces a probability P (α(s)) with which her illegal behaviour will be detected and the inspectee has to pay a fine σM N (s); on the other hand, she escapes with a probability 1 − P (α(s)) and gains an illegal profit M (a) N (s). Moreover, the inspectees pays a cost for the change of strategies, which is quadratic in the transition rates i.e.,
. Therefore, at each time s with a crime distribution X N (s) of the population, the ath inspectee with a crime level M 
and a terminal payoff
, the ath inspectee aims to mamixise her payoff function
j=1 q ij (t) = 0, and q ii (t) is such that q ii (t) = − j =i q ij (t). In the meanwhile, the inspector can observe the crime distribution X N (s) of the population. At any time s ∈ [0, T ], the inspector pays an amount of investment resources for inspection α(s) and gets a payoff from any individual inspectee at the crime level l i :
where η N > 0 is given and prescribes the weight that the inspector assigns to any single inspectee in the finite N population. The inspector aims to maximise her expected payoff at each time instance s ∈ [0, T ], that is she wants to maximise
Plug (2.7) into (2.8) and define L := N η N . Then the inspector aims to maximise her payoff function
over her inspection investment α(s). By differentiating the function U N with respect to the first variable and together with Condition (2.5), the function U N in Eq. (2.9) has a unique maximiser α * N :
where (P ′ ) −1 denotes the inverse function of P ′ . Note that the index N is used in the notations of objects in the setting of finite N inspectees to distinguish them from their counterparties in the mean field inspection game, see Section 3.
Remark 2.1. The parameter η N is small, compared to the large number N of inspectees. The parameter L = N η N in (2.9) can be interpreted as the approximate total fine from the whole population of the inspectees. In Section 3, we will consider a limiting model by sending the number of inspectees to infinity, i.e. N → ∞. In the limiting model, the value of the parameter L is kept the same as in the finite population problem and η N → 0 as N → ∞. In other words, in the inspector's viewpoint, when the number of inspectees becomes very large, her total expected payoff is always bounded, and any individual inspectee's contribution Φ N in (2.7) to the inspector's payoff becomes negligible.
We are interested in finding Nash equilibria of this type of inspection games. This means to find the best-response investment strategy α * N (t) at any t ∈ [0, T ] and a family {Q * (1) , . . . , Q * (N ) }, where Q * (a) , a ∈ {1, . . . , N }, denotes the best switching strategy of the ath inspectee as the best response. When N is very large, the complexity of this problem gets immense.
In this paper, we will apply the mean field games methodology to solve this type of games and provide an ǫ-equiliblium. Roughly speaking, we will take the number N of inspectees to infinity and set up the (limiting) mean field model with a continuum of inspectees. We call this game with a single inspector and a continuum of inspectees a mean field inspection game. Then we prove that any solution to the mean field inspection game presents an ǫ-equilibrium to the original model with N inspectees.
The mean field inspection game
In this section, we study a mean field inspection game with a continuum of inspectees and one inspector. First, let's discuss the dynamics of the continuum limit as N → ∞. The state space of the continuum is naturally specified by
so that the limiting generator A t :
The limiting operator A t in (3.1) generates a controlled crime distribution evolution of the continuum of inspectees on the state space Σ d , which is denoted by
where X i (t) describes the fraction of inspectees at the crime level l i . Then the limiting distribution evolution X is governed by the kinetic equation
It is worth noting that in contrast to X N generated by L N t in (2.4), the limiting evolution X is deterministic, since it is modelled as the solution to the ordinary differential equation (3.2). Now in the mean field inspection game, at any time t ∈ [0, T ] with a crime distribution X(t) = (X 1 (t), . . . , X d (t)), the inspector aims to maximise her payoff U (α(t), X(t)) over her inspection investment α(t), where
By the condition (2.5), for any X(t) ∈ Σ d , the function U in (3.3) has a unique maximiser α * (t) given by:
where (P ′ ) −1 denotes the inverse function of P ′ . Let {M (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} denote the controlled state dynamics of a representative inspectee of the continuum of inspectees. Starting at any time t ∈ [0, T ] and a state l i ∈ L d , a representative inspectee of the continuum aims to maximise the payoff
where the function α * is defined in (3.4) and the terminal cost function
Denote the running cost function in the payoff (3.5) by h :
where q i = (q i1 , . . . , q id ). The value function for a representative inspectee
By the dynamic programming principle, for any given distribution evolution
with a terminal function V (T, ·) = J T (·, X(T )), where the function H :
with the function α * defined in (3.4), where φ = (φ 1 , . . . , φ d ) and q i = (q i1 , . . . , q id ) ∈ R d . The first order condition shows that the unique maximiser in (3.10) is
and by definition q * ii (t, x; φ) = − j =i q * ij (t, x; φ). Notice that the individual optimal switching function q * in (3.11) does not explicitly depend on the aggregate behaviour of the population X. However, in the model, the variable φ will be the value of the value function in (3.7) at each time instance, which depends on X.
To summarise, the function α * in (3.4) gives the best response for any inspector to the prevailing crime distribution X(t) ∈ Σ d at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. The running cost function h in (3.6) for a representative inspectee depends on the best response function of the inspector α * . The value function V in (3.7) for the representative inspectee is the solution of the HJB equation (3.9). The resulting best response of a representative inspectee is the optimal switching function q * in (3.11). Rationally, the representative inspectee applies the resulting optimal control policy q * to control her state dynamics of crime levels. The resulting crime distribution evolution, as the aggregate behaviour of the continuum of inspectees, is described by the solution X = {X(t), [0, T ]} to (3.2) with the optimal switching q * in (3.11). The solution X should be consistent with the one observed by the inspector as the prevailing crime distribution. Hence we get the following system of coupled equations
where the Hamiltonian H is defined in (3.10) and the optimal transition function q * is defined in (3.11). The main feature of this coupled system of equations is that Eq. (3.12) is a backward ordinary differential equation, yet (3.13) is a forward ordinary differential equation. This model can be viewed as a modified version of standard mean field games equations in discrete-state space setting with a deterministic major player.
Main results
First, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the coupled system (3.12)-(3.13). In Theorem 4.1, we show that for a short time game, there exists a unique solution to the mean field inspection game, namely, the single inspector has a unique best response to the continuum of inspectees and any representative inspectee has a unique best response to the inspector and the aggregate behaviour of the continuum; whereas, for a long time game, we show the existence of a solution to the mean field inspection game. Then in Theorem 4.2, we show that the probability distributions of finite N -inspectees on their state space converges to the one of a limiting system as N → ∞. Finally, in Theorem 4.3, we conclude that a solution to the mean field inspection game is an ǫ-equilibrium to an inspection game with a finite number N of inspectees.
Theorem 4.1. (i) For a small T , the coupled system of equations (3.12)-(3.13) has a unique solution (X, V ); (ii) for an arbitrary finite T , there exists a solution to the coupled system of equations (3.12)-(3.13).
Proof. The proof to Theorem 4.1 consists of three steps and can be found in Appendix A Next, we prove that the pair of resulting best responses α * (X(t)) and q * (t, l i , X(t); V (t, ·; X)) presents an ǫ-equilibrium of an inspection game with one inspector and N inspectees, where (X, V ) is a solution to equations (3.12)-(3.13) and α * and q * are defined respectively in (3.4) and (3.11).
To this end, we will tag one insepctee and impose that she applies a switching strategyq(t, l i , x) which is Lipschitz continuous in the variable x and different from q * (t, l i , x). LetM tag,q N (t) (resp. M tag,q * N (t)) denote the state dynamics of the tagged inspectee with switching strategyq (resp. with q * ) in the finite N inspectees setting with a given initial data m N (0) ∈ L d . LetM tag,q (t) (resp. M tag,q * (t)) denote the state dynamics of the tagged inspectee with switching strategyq (resp. with q * ) in the continuum limit with a given initial data m(0) ∈ L d . Meanwhile all other inspectees apply the same strategy q * .
The controlled Markov process
{ X N [q * ,q] (t),M tag,q N (t) , t ∈ [0, T ]} of N interacting inspectees is generated by the operators L N t [q * ,q] acting on [C(S N d × L d )] d (
the set of continuous and bounded vector-valued functions
where y = (n 1 /N, . . . , n d /N ).
One can under the operators in (4.1) in the following way. Consider that the tagged inspectee is at the crime level l k ∈ L d and there are n k inspectees who are at the crime level l k . The first term in (4.1) prescribes the interactions between inspectees who are any crime levels l i ∈ L d \ l k , and apply the strategy q * ; the second term in (4.1) prescribes the interactions between inspectees who are at the crime level l k , except the tagged inspectee, and apply the strategy q * ; the third term in (4.1) prescribes the behaviour of the tagged inspectee who are at l k and applies the strategyq. [q * ] (t). Such notations are used e.g. by Gomes in [14] . However, the distinction between these two notations disappear in the limit N → ∞.
The controlled process { X [q * ,q] (t),M tag,q (t) , t ∈ [0, T ]} of the continuum limit as N → ∞ is generated by the limiting operators
where the space [ 
is not a Markov process and cannot be discussed separately, since the distribution evolution of the N interacting inspectees {X N [q * ,q] (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is coupled with any individual's dynamics {M tag,q N (t), t ∈ [0, T ]}. In the continuum limit, since any single inspectee's behaviour has negligible impact on the whole population's statistical behaviour, the distribution dynamics {X [q * ,q] (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is still the solution to the ordinary differential equation (3.13), although one inspectee chooses a different strategy from q * . Since {X [q * ,q] (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is a deterministic process and not affected by any single inspectee's behavior {M tag,q (t), t ∈ [0, T ]}, one can view {M tag,q (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} as a Markov process, parameterised by
We show that, as N → ∞, the Markov process
L N t in (4.1) converges to the Markov process { X [q * ,q] (t),M tag,q (t) , t ∈ [0, T ]} generated by A t in (4.2). This result is crucial for the final result which is stated in Theorem 4.3.
To this end, we need the concept of propagators. For a set of continuous function C(Σ d , L d ), a family of mappings Ψ t,r from C(Σ d , L d ) to itself, parametrized by the pairs of numbers r ≤ t (resp. t ≤ r) from a given finite or infinite interval is called a (forward) propagator in S, if Ψ t,t is the identity operator in C(Σ d , L d ) for all t and the following chain rule, or propagator equation, holds for r ≤ s ≤ t: 
hold a.s. in s and for f ∈ D( A t ), the equations 
which implies the convergence of the semigroup on the core [ Here we only need to check the conditions in Appendix B.3 are satisfied. By (3.11) and (A.3) we have that the optimal switching function q * (t, l i , x) is Lipschitz continuous in x. It is clear that from (3.13), the function F in (B.7) with F i (t, x) = d j=1 x j q * ji (t, x; V (t, ·)) is Lipschitz continuous in both t and x. Together with the condition thatq is Lipschitz in the variable x, the conditions in Appendix B.3 are satisfied. The proof is completed.
Remark 4.3. This kind of convergence results of N -particle approximations have been proved e.g. by Kolokoltsov, Troeva and Yang (2014) for a diffusion process and by Kolokoltsov, Li and Yang (2012) for rather general Markov processes with smoothing property (excluding the present case).
As a direct consequence of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 , we have the result in the following theorem, stating that any solution derived from the limiting model (3.12)-(3.13) can be used to approximate the one for an N player game.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that (i) as N → ∞, the initial data x N 0 ∈ Σ d converges to certain x 0 ∈ Σ d and the initial data
Then a strategy profile
with α * and q * defined respectively in (3.4) and (3.11), and with (X, V ) being a solution to the system (3.12)-(3.13), is an ǫ-equilibrium in any N inspectee inspection game with ǫ = ǫ(N ) → 0 as N → ∞.
Proof. First denote by M q * N (t) and M q * (t) the state dynamics of an inspectee with the switching strategy q * in the finite N inspectees setting and in the continuum liming setting, respectively. Similarly, denote by X N [q * ] (t) and X [q * ] (t) the state dynamics of the population with every inspectee applying the switching strategy q * in the finite N inspectees setting and in the continuum liming setting, respectively. In fact, X [q * ] (t) and X [q * ,q] (t) generated by the operator A t [q * ,q] in (4.2) are the same object, namely the solution to Eq. (3.13), see Remark 4.2.
To show that the strategy α * (X [q * ] (t)) with X [q * ] (t) being a solution to (3.13) is an ǫ-equilibrium for the inspector, we need to show that, for ǫ = ǫ(N ) > 0,
where the payoff function U N defined in Eq (2.9), and the inspector's best response functions α * N (t) and α * (t) are defined in Eq (2.10) and Eq (3.4) in the N inspectees setting and in the mean field inspection setting, respectively.
By the definition of α * N (t) and α * (t), we have that α * N (t) and α * (t) are Lipschitz continuous in X N (t) and X(t) respectively. Then by Theorem 4.2 we have
That is, for N big enough, we have α * (t) = α * N (t) ± ǫ with ǫ → 0 as N → ∞. Therefore for N big enough, again by Theorem 4.2
with ǫ → 0 as N → ∞, where the continuity of P in α is used. Next, to show that the strategy q * is an ǫ-equilibrium for an individual inspectee, we need to show, for any inspectee a = 1, . . . , N and ǫ = ǫ(N ) > 0
for anyq where the payoff function J (a) is defined in (2.6). Since the payoff function J (a) defined in (2.6) is Lipschitz in X N , the appendix C implies Eq. (4.5). The proof is completed.
Approximation analysis
In this section, we will approximate the optimal switching strategy q * defined in (3.11) by a sequence of smooth function q * η , for η > 0. We prove that any smooth approximation q * η as a solution to a forward-backward model is also ǫ -Nash to any inspection game with finite-number inspectees. This approximation analysis is motived by the following two considerations.
Firstly, based on the result that there exists a solution, a consistent pair (X(t), V (t, ·)), to the system of equations (3.12)-(3.13), one can obtain an optimal investment strategy α * (X(t)) by (3.4) and an optimal switching strategy q * (t, l i , X(t); V (t, ·)) by (3.11). Since there are no analytic formulae for computing X and V , one needs to find numerical solutions of X and V . In this paper, we do not attempt to investigate methods for abstaining numerical solutions but we intend to adapt our results proved in the previous sections for numerical analysis. Recall that the obtained optimal switching strategy q * defined in (3.11) is a Lipschitz function in x. However, for numerical analysis, very often the smoothness of the function q * is needed. The results in Theorem 5.1 makes our theoretical results in section 4 applicable to numerical analysis.
Secondly, considering smooth approximations q * η as ǫ -Nash equilibria to the inspection game with finite-number inspectees enables us to discuss the error bound of the approximation as N → ∞.
Now by standard procedure we construct a sequence of matrix-valued smooth functions q * η :
where the function φ η is a smooth mollifier. We have that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
A typical example of the molllifier φ η can be φ η (y) =
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that as N → ∞, the initial data
is an ǫ-Nash for a finite game with ǫ = ǫ(η, N ) → 0 as N → ∞ and η → 0.
(ii) if q * η defined in (5.1) is two continuously differentiable in x, ǫ is of order 1/N .
Proof. (i) To prove q * η is an ǫ-Nash, we aim to prove that for (t, l i ) ∈ [0, T ] × L d and for any otherq
Take the approximating smooth optimal control q * η (t, l i , x) = (q * η,i1 (t, X η (t)), . . . , q * η,id (t, X η (t))) and consider the system
Let X q * η be the solution to the system (5.3). We have that X q * η converges to X q * as η → 0. By Theorem 4.2, as N → ∞, X N q * η → X q * η and X N q * → X q * . Therefore we have X N q * η → X N q * as N → ∞ and η → 0. Since the payoff function J (a) defined in (2.6) is continuous and Lipschitz continuous in X N , we have for small enough η > 0 and big enough N
where the result in the appendix C is used. Hence (5.2) is proved.
(ii) To prove ǫ is of order 1/N for a twice continuously differentiable q * η , we aim to show that By (4.1) and (4.2), we write
In fact, since q * η is twice continuously differentiable in x, the space [
Further, by Taylor theorem, (5.5) can be expended by using the following representation (ref. Kolokoltsov (2010) , Corollary F.2)
To complete the proof, we need the following calculation: for s ≤ t 
6 Appendix
A Proof to Theorem 4.1
The proof to Theorem 4.1 consists of three steps.
Step 1: for any given X ∈ C([0, T ], Σ d ), we show that the HJB equation (3.12) is well posed. Moreover, the resulting solution, denoted by V (t, l i ; X), is Lipschitz with respect to the parameter X.
For proving the existence of a solution to the ordinary differential equation (3.12), it is sufficient to have that the function H defined in (3.10) is Lipschitz in φ uniformly.
Since the optimal switching function q * ij in (3.11) is Lipschitz continuous in φ, we conclude that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any
Therefore, for any X ∈ C([0, T ], Σ d ), there exists a unique solution to (3.12).
To show that the solution V is Lipshitz with respect to the parameter X, we write the equation (3.9) in integral form:
The function H defined in (3.10) is Lipschitz in x uniformly, since for any l i ∈ L d , φ ∈ R d and any
where (A.1) and (A.2) are used to get the last inequality. Then by Gronwall's inequality, the solution to (3.12) is Lipschitz continuous in X, i.e. there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Consequenctly, by the definition of q * in (3.11), we have that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and i, j = 1, . . . , d
Step 2: we prove the existence of the solution to the following equation
with a given switching policy q which is Lipschitz in x and then prove the sensitivity of the solution X(·) with respect to those q which are Lipschitz in x.
Define a vector field G :
To prove the existence of a solution to (3.13) it is sufficient to prove that G is Lipschitz continuous in x. We say G is Lipschitz continuous in
x. Now we show that G i is Lipschitz in x by using Schwarz inequality. Since q is assumed to be Lipschitz in x, we have for t ∈ [0, T ] and x, y ∈ Σ d , .6) which implies that G i is Lipschitz in the second variable x. Hence, for any given q which is Lipschitz in x, there exists a solution to (A.4).
To prove the sensitivity of the solution to (A.4) with respect to those q which are Lipschitz in x, we rewrite (A.4) in a integral form. Let X ( resp. Y ) be the solution to (A.4) under the control policy q 1 (resp. q 2 ), with the same initial value x 0 ∈ Σ d , namely
Then by (A.6), we have
By Gronwall's inequality, we get for any t ∈ [0, T ]
with a constant c > 0.
Step 3: In summary, so far we have considered the following mapping
By analysing (3.12) we get (A.3), namely the resulting optimal switching function q * (t, l i , x) is Lipschitz with respect to x; further, by analysing (3.13) with any switching policy q which is Lipschitz in x, we get (A.7), namely the solution to (3.13) is Lipschitz with respect to its control parameter q. Therefore we can conclude that the mapping Γ (A.8) is Lipschitz, that is, for any
where the norm · ∞ is defined in (2.2). Thus for a small T , the mapping Γ is a contraction, proving statement (i). For arbitrary finite T , one has, from (3.2), that the image of the mapping Γ is bounded equicontinuous and hence a compact subset of C([0, T ], Σ d ) (by Arzela-Ascoli theorem). Hence by the Brouwer fixed point theorem, Γ has a fixed point, proving statement (ii).
d is a core for the generator A t
This appendix aims to prove step by step that the space [ 
Finally in B.3, we consider a time-nonhomogenous Markov chain M (t), t ∈ [0, T ] modulated by a deterministic system X(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. This Fellow process (M (t), X(t)), t ∈ [0, T ] is exactly the one generated by the limiting operator A t defined in (4.2). We show that [
is indeed a core for the generator of the system (M (t), X(t)), t ∈ [0, T ], namely the generator A t defined in (4.2).
Recall that the space [ 
B.1 Evolution of the deterministic dynamics X(t)
Consider a system X(t), t ∈ [0, T ] which is described by the first-order ordinary differential equatioṅ
with a given initial x 0 ∈ Σ d and F :
Let φ t denote the semigroup generated by the generator A in (B.2). The solution of Eq. (B.1) is
Proof. Since the space [C 1 (Σ d )] d is not invariant under the operator A (B.2), we cannot apply the standard result (c.f. Kallenberg (2002) ) that a dense invariant subset of the domain is always a core. We introduce a subspace by collecting all shifted functions from [C 1 (Σ where the mollifier φ n is at least first order differentiable and with compact support. So we have, as n → ∞, F n i ∈ C 1 (Σ d ) converges to F ij ∈C(Σ d ) as n → ∞. Then we consider the following approximating systemsẊ t = F n (X t )
with an initial x 0 ∈ Σ d . Let X n t (x 0 ) denote the solution to this approximating systems. Since F n converges F as n → ∞, we have X n t (x 0 ) converges to X t as n → ∞. Therefore the closure of the subspace [ Let the Markov chain M (t), t ∈ [0, T ] be modulated by a deterministic evolution X(t), t ∈ [0, t] which is described by the first order ordinary differential equatioṅ Proof. Following the proof for A.1, we construct a sequence of matrix-valued smooth functions Q n with each entry q n ij ∈ C 1 (Σ d ) defined as where the mollifier φ n is at least first order differentiable and with compact support, so that Q n converges to Q as n → ∞. The solutions to the approximating systemṡ h = Q n (X n t (x 0 ))h are denoted by h n t (x 0 , h 0 ), where the sequence X n t (x 0 ) is constructed in the proof for A.1. Since X n t (x 0 ) → X t (x 0 ) as n → ∞ and Q is a Lipschitz function, we have Q n (X n t (x 0 )) → Q(X t (x 0 )) as n → ∞. Hence, h n t (x 0 , h 0 ) → h t (x 0 , h 0 ) as n → ∞. Therefore the closure of the space [ C ǫ equilibrium under a general payoff function J This appendix states that, for an inspection game with a general payoff function J of inspectees, any optimal q * derived from the corresponding mean field inspection game model is an approximate Nash for any inspectee.
